調用使用 HTTP（而非 HTTPS）協議與服務器通信。
所用利用 HTTP、FTP 或 gopher 的通信均未經過驗證和加密。因此可能會受到危害，特別是在移動環境中設備要利用 WiFi 連接頻繁連接不安全的、公共的無線網絡。
例子 1：以下示例通過 HTTP 協議（而不是 HTTPS 協議）讀取數據。
URL url = new URL("http://www.android.com/");
HttpURLConnection urlConnection = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
try {
InputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(urlConnection.getInputStream());
readStream(in);
...
}
instream 通過未加密和未驗證的通道傳輸，因而可能受到危害。
[1] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 - (OWASP 2004) A10 Insecure Configuration Management
[2] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 - (OWASP 2007) A9 Insecure Communications
[3] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 - (OWASP 2010) A9 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
[4] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3 - (STIG 3) APP3250.1 CAT I, APP3250.2 CAT I, APP3250.3 CAT II, APP3250.4 CAT II
[5] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.4 - (STIG 3.4) APP3250.1 CAT I, APP3250.2 CAT I, APP3250.3 CAT II, APP3250.4 CAT II
[6] Standards Mapping - FIPS200 - (FISMA) CM, SC
[7] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration - (CWE) CWE ID 311
[8] Designing for Security Android
[9] Standards Mapping - Web Application Security Consortium 24 + 2 - (WASC 24 + 2) Information Leakage
[10] Standards Mapping - SANS Top 25 2009 - (SANS 2009) Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 319
[11] OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks OWASP
[12] Standards Mapping - SANS Top 25 2010 - (SANS 2010) Porous Defenses - CWE ID 311
[13] Standards Mapping - SANS Top 25 2011 - (SANS Top 25 2011) Porous Defenses - CWE ID 311
[14] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.2 - (PCI 1.2) Requirement 4.1, Requirement 6.3.1.4, Requirement 6.5.9
[15] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.1 - (PCI 1.1) Requirement 4.1, Requirement 6.5.10
[16] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 - (PCI 2.0) Requirement 4.1, Requirement 6.5.4
[17] S. Fahl, M. Harbach, T. Muders, M. Smith, L. Baumgartner, B. Friesleben Why Eve and Mallory Love Android:An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security